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ANTITRUST LAW-EXCLUSIVE DEALING ARRANGEMENTS-EMPLOYMENT BY

3 oF THE CLAYTON AarPetitioner nationally markets its product through exclusive dealing contracts with 80,700 independent distributors. In 1958 petitioner's distributors accounted-as to vitamin concentrates-for 61.52 percent of all houseto-house sales 8.6 percent of the total retail sales, and 34.6 percent of the
total sales, of similarly-composed products. The FTC examiner's finding
that petitioner had violated section 3 of the Clayton Act1 was sustained
by the Com.mission. On appeal, held, affirmed, one judge dissenting in
part. The control of 61.52, 34.6 or 8.6 percent of the market sales by a
seller having exclusive dealing contracts with its buyers is sufficient proof
that competition has been "substantially lessened" in the line of commerce
affected . .Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Early Clayton Act cases indicated that exclusive dealing contracts violated the act when an inference of substantial foreclosure existed, and this
inference could be supplied by either the dominant market position of
the seller2 or the quantity of commerce involved under the contracts.3
This narrow criterion was expanded in the notable decision of Standard
Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 4 in which the Supreme Court
verbalized what has been construed as the "quantitative substantiality"
test: "[T]he qualifying clause of section 3 is satisfied by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected.'' 5 The Court, in rejecting evidence introduced by Standard
in an attempt to justify its use of exclusive dealing contracts, expressly
indicated that a detailed market analysis of the competitive effects of exclusive dealing arrangements was not included in its "quantitative subCouRTs oF DuAL TESTS IN .APPLYING SECTION

1 "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to lease or make a sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies or other commodities • • • on the condition • . • that the • • • purchaser
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies
or other commodities of a competitor •.. of the .•• seller, where the effect of such
••• sale, or contract ••• may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
2 See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United
Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922); Standard Fashion Co. v. MagraneHouston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
3 See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
4 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
5 Id. at 314. This test has evolved from an absolute quantitative standard, considering only the dollar volume or amount of goods involved under the exclusive contracts, to a comparative quantitative standard examining the percentage of commerce
affected in relation to the market as a whole. For convenience, the term "quantitative
substantiality" is presently used in reference to the comparative quantitative substantiality standard. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), with
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). "Quantitative substantiality"
is to be distinguished from "qualitative analysis," which weighs a variety of economic
factors to determine the effect of exclusive contracts on competition, including the percentage of commerce affected.
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stantiality" test. 6 Rather, it was indicated that proof of foreclosure of
competition in a substantial percentage of the relevant market would be
sufficient. As a result, Standard's exclusive dealing contracts with sixteen
percent of the independent dealers in a seven-state area, involving 6.7
percent of the total gasoline sold, were held illegal.
The "quantitative substantiality" test was rigorously criticized because
of its disregard of the economic utility of requirements contracts and its failure to examine the availability of outlets for the adequate marketing of a
competitor's product.7 As if in response to this criticism, the Supreme
Court presumably broadened its criterion by declaring, in Tampa Elec.
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,8 that an economic inquiry into the effect of
exclusive dealing arrangements on competition was necessary, in that case,
in determining the applicability of section 3.9 This "qualitative analysis"
test contemplates an examination of the line of commerce involved, a
determination of the effective area of competition, a consideration of the
opportunity other buyers had to enter or remain in the market, and a
weighing of the justifications for the exclusive contracts within the market
involved.10 However, the Court in Tampa Electric weakened its opinion
by attempting to distinguish the case before it from Standard Stations,
noting that the seller had but one exclusive dealing contract in the former
rather than the "myriad outlets ... coupled with ... exclusive contracts"
which Standard had controlled.11 This differentiation impliedly acknowledged the continued existence of the "quantitative substantiality" test,
thereby leaving in doubt the applicability of the Tampa Electric principle
to a given section 3 case.
The principal case further obscures the judicial use of the "qualitative
analysis" test. The court of appeals not only cited the "quantitative substantiality" test as authority for its holding in the principal case, but,
furthermore, inferred that Tampa Electric was decided on the basis of
the same test. 12 Thus the court neglected to give recognition to the
ti 337 U.S. at 311. See also Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594 (1953); Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940).
7 See generally Arr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANrITRusr REP. 142 (1955); HANDLER,
ANTITRusr IN PERSPECTIVE 34-38 (1957); Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic
Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REv. 913, 919-41 (1952).
8 365 U.S. 320 (1961), 59 MICH. L. REv. 1236.
9 365 U.S. at 329. Previous to Tampa Electric this approach had been followed by
the FTC in contrast to the Standard Stations test. In remanding to the examiner, the
Commission ordered the acceptance of seller's evidence indicating a small percentage
of dealers under exclusive contracts, an increase in competition and a decrease in
the seller's share of the market. Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485, 487 (1953). But see Timken
Roller Bearing Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1960-1961 TRANSFER. BINDER. ,i 29373 (1961);
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 1960-1961 TRANSFER BINDER. 11 29891
(1960).
10 365 U.S. at 327-29, 334.
11 Id. at 334.
12 Principal case at 539. The court said that the pre-emption of the market by the
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broader test which Tampa Electric had stated. Had the court employed
the "qualitative analysis" test, the result in the principal case might have
been different. For instance, the court might have found the extent of
door-to-door sales negligible in comparison to the sale of vitamins through
other outlets, the percentage of distributors small compared to existing
outlets, or the availability of outlets unlimited since most persons can
readily qualify as door-to-door distributors. Failure of the court to give
further consideration to the Tampa Electric rationale leads to the speculation that the principal case signifies the availability of dual tests, either
of which may be used by the courts in their interpretation of the qualifying
clause of section 3: the "quantitative substantiality" test in cases involving
a seller occupying a position of leadership or dominance within the relevant
market, and the "qualitative analysis" test in situations where there is a
non-dominant seller. This supposition finds support in the failure of the
Supreme Court to overrule the "quantitative substantiality" test in Tampa
Electric and the inference by the Court that Standard Stations would still
apply when a leading seller pre-empted "myriad outlets."13 Further grounds
for this viewpoint exist in the factual situations of the cases that have followed either of these tests. Decisions hol~ing section 3 to be violated under
the test of Standard Stations have involved sellers with dominant market positions14 while those applying the criteria of Tampa Electric involved sellers
occupying a weaker market position.15 The mutual exclusiveness in the
use of these tests is demonstrated by the two cases16 that have employed
the "qualitative analysis" standard. The same result could have been
reached in both cases by use of the "quantitative substantiality" test, since
only a small percentage of commerce, albeit not de minimis, was involved
under the exclusive contracts, but the courts refused to apply that test
because of the innocuous position of the seller in the relevant market.17
seller in Tampa Electric amounted to only .77% as compared to at least 8.6% in the
principal case.

1s 365 U.S. at 334.
14 See, e.g., Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954) (seller's exclusive
contracts included two largest buyers in limited market, held, § 3 violated); Dictograph
Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955) (seller's
exclusive contracts involved 22% of the cream of the nation's retail hearing-aid distributors, held, § 3 violated); United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280
(S.D. Cal. 1951), afj'd per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952) (seller's 7,546 exclusive contracts
amounted to over $43,000,000 in 1950 alone, held, § 3 violated).
15 See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (seller had but one
exclusive contract involving .77% of coal sold in the relevant market, held, contract
valid); Curly's Dairy, Inc. v. Dairy Co-op. Ass'n, 202 F. Supp. 481 (D. Ore. 1962) (local
seller's exclusive contracts pre-empted less than 2% of available retailers, held, contracts
valid). Compare Rural Gas Serv., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. ,r 15515 (1961) (seller's exclusive
contracts accounted for less than 4% of the industry's total sales in the relevant market,
held, contracts valid).
16 Ibid.
17 See ibid. Since "qualitative analysis" includes in part the quantitative approach,
cases not violating § 3 under the latter may reach the same result under the former.
However, the converse is not necessarily true. For example, it has been suggested that

592

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

Therefore, it is submitted that the courts may apply a "qualitative analysis"
test in cases charging small businesses with violating section 3, but will
continue to use the "quantitative substantiality" test, as was done in the
principal case, as to sellers found to occupy a preponderant market
position.
A dual approach to section 3 raises a further imponderable for the
consideration of the courts. When does a seller have enough economic
power in the relevant market to qualify for the "quantitative substantiality"
rather than the "qualitative analysis" test? This question will encourage
decisions to be appealed in hopes that the higher court will apply the
alternative test. Moreover, the dual standard unfairly discriminates against
large concerns that might have legitimate needs for exclusive dealing arrangements. The court in the principal case missed an opportunity to
mitigate the hazards of a double standard of interpretation by clarifying
the applicability of Tampa Electric to a section 3 case like the one before
it. Using Tampa Electric as precedent, the court could have attempted
to adopt a single "qualitative analysis" test for all section 3 cases. On
the other hand, it could have recognized the existence of a dual standard
and offered some definite criteria for choosing one or the other of the tests
in a given section 3 situation. Instead, these tasks were left for future decisions.
Walter A. UTick

a "qualitative analysis" test applied to the Standard Stations situation would alter that
decision since the prohibition of exclusive dealing contracts could have encouraged
dealers to give up their independent status as purchasers and become agents of the luge
oil companies. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 887 U.S. 293, 819-21 (1949) (Douglas,
J., separate opinion); Lockhart 8: Sacks, supra note 7, at 916.

